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4  Zero Rating and the Holy Grail: Universal 
Standards for Net Neutrality
 by Arturo J. Carrillo
4.1 Introduction
In March of 2016, the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at 
Harvard University sponsored a workshop on zero rating attended 
by tech company representatives, digital rights activists from a 
range of countries, and U.S.-based academics. During the initial 
round of comments, the majority of participants highlighted a 
central, overarching question on the agenda: do universal standards 
or core principles exist to govern net neutrality, and by extension 
zero rating, that could be agreed upon by all stakeholders? 
Although much of the ensuing discussion reflected the difficulty of 
answering that question in the affirmative, there was one response 
that seemed to fit the bill: international human rights law. The point 
was simple. Why insist on searching for or creating new standards 
that could apply to net neutrality issues across the board when such 
a normative framework already exists? Why not view zero rating as 
a limitation on net neutrality understood as a norm of human rights, 
which net neutrality demonstrably is? Despite some support from 
a number of the Latin American activists present, the human rights 
response to the zero rating conundrum fell largely on deaf ears. 
It is, of course, not surprising to find that in the United States the 
human rights framework is not a natural context for the discussion 
of net neutrality issues, though some attention has been drawn to 
it (Carrillo & Nunziato, 2015, pp. 102-104). Similarly, other frontline 
battles that have focused on zero rating (as in India) have been 
largely devoid of rigorous reference to technical human rights 
considerations. But national debates on net neutrality and zero 
rating have and will continue to play out differently in other regions 
of the world that are subject to more robust human rights legal 
frameworks, such as Europe and Latin America. There, universally-
recognized human rights norms codified in regional treaties — the 
American Convention on Human Rights; the European Convention 
on Human Rights — provide objective standards for consistently and 
justly analyzing net neutrality issues through region-specific human 
rights mechanisms. The purpose of this paper is to take one region as 
a case study in progress — Latin America — to map the human-rights 
framework that governs freedom of expression online, including net 
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neutrality and zero rating, with reference to the challenges that a 
number of Latin-American countries are facing.
This paper will argue that the implementation of net neutrality 
protections by States in Latin America (and elsewhere), when 
oriented by a respect for fundamental human rights, can lead to more 
just and sustainable policies and outcomes than when it is not. The 
lessons to be learned from the ongoing Latin American experience 
are relevant to other regions of the world because (1) the applicable 
United Nations-based/universal norms are global in effect, and (2) the 
core normative values embodied in both regional and universal human 
rights treaties are substantively the same, allowing for constructive 
comparison across regions.145 Part I begins by outlining the rationale 
for why international human rights law, which includes regional human 
rights treaties like the American Convention on Human Rights of the 
Organization of American States (OAS), provides the most viable 
option for establishing a universal normative regime to govern net 
neutrality in practice. It then synthesizes in relevant part the universal 
(United Nations) and regional (OAS) human rights rules that apply to 
most countries in Latin America. In Part II, I consider this consolidated 
human rights framework in relation to ongoing net neutrality debates 
in different countries, namely Mexico, Colombia and Chile. Even a brief 
analysis illustrates how, in the long run, the human rights framework 
will increasingly shape national policy-making in this area, and not 
just in Latin America. What emerges is a clearer picture not only of 
the human rights standards that, in fact, already apply to the net 
neutrality principle everywhere in the world, but also of the manner 
in which the constructive application of that framework can shape its 
implementation globally in more equitable terms.
4.2 International Legal Frameworks
Before turning to the nuts and bolts of the above-referenced 
international legal framework, a threshold question remains. Even if 
one recognizes that net neutrality is today a consolidated norm of 
international human rights law (see Part I.A), why does it matter? 
145 This is the reason why, for example, the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression 
of the Organization of American States (OAS) will reference standards relating to 
freedom of expression from United Nations treaties and experts when interpreting the 
scope of application of the American Convention. See, e.g. OAS Special Rapporteur, 
2014, para. 64 (discussing how the interpretation by the U.N. Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Expression and Opinion of the “right to response” in the digital realm offers a new and 
better kind of less restrictive alternative to measures that might unduly limit freedom of 
expression online under the American Convention).
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That is, what is to be gained by re-framing the zero rating debate 
in human rights terms? As it turns out, there are a number of 
compelling reasons for invoking the human rights legal framework 
in this respect. First and foremost, it situates net neutrality issues 
squarely within a universally recognized normative framework that 
imposes legal obligations on most, if not all, States. Safeguarding 
net neutrality is thus a duty incumbent on governments, rather than 
merely a desirable or contested policy alternative. This approach 
further ensures that discussions about how to restrict net neutrality 
through zero rating or sponsored data, like those taking place in 
the United States, Europe, India, and a host of other countries, 
transpire within the same, universally applicable regime established 
by international law (which includes regional human rights treaties), 
promoting greater normative and practical consistency across the 
board (though, of course, not guaranteeing it).
Second, under international human rights law, net neutrality is defined 
in human-centric rather than data-centric terms (see Part I.A). The 
discussion ceases to be about data packets or differential pricing and 
becomes more about people. This shift is not merely semantic because 
it portends important implications for the norm’s implementation, 
especially in terms of connectivity.146 As explained below, it means 
that zero rating practices as transgressions of net neutrality can no 
longer be discussed in all-or-nothing terms. Instead, these practices 
have to be viewed as proposed limits on some peoples’ freedom of 
expression (understood as net neutrality) intended in substantial part 
to enhance the freedom of expression rights of others (i.e. through 
expanded connectivity). This consequentialist analysis emphasizes 
the value of maximizing the enjoyment of fundamental rights within 
a given society and thus promotes it, in accordance with the State’s 
international legal obligations.
Third, the human rights framework provides structure and rigor to 
what often are heated contests of unmoored dogma: net neutrality 
absolutism clashing with the imperative to close the digital divide 
or the inviolability of the market place. Evaluating net neutrality 
regulation as a function of the State’s duties under international law 
opens practical pathways for constructively debating zero rating, 
146 There does not appear to be a universally accepted definition of connectivity in 
international law or practice. Connectivity for purposes of this paper is defined as 
access to the Internet and to Internet-based content or services. This is how most 
commentators refer to it.
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not least because it establishes normative parameters that apply 
equally to all sides engaged in the discussions. People stop talking 
past each other, and start talking responsively to each other. At 
the same time — and this is critical — the human rights approach 
is the only one that expressly accounts for all the others. Generally 
speaking, my experience has been that those who view net neutrality 
as an inviolable network principle tend to pay little heed to what the 
economists and free market advocates say; others who critique net 
neutrality as a mere priority preference tend to prioritize competition, 
consumer choice or the public interest. In other words, the prevailing 
perspectives on net-neutrality and zero rating (the technical and 
economic analyses in particular) do not easily accommodate each 
other, if at all. With few exceptions, none pay anything more than lip 
service to human rights (Carrillo, 2016, Part II.A & pp. 155-56).
Recourse to human rights law in this context, then, is like finding the 
Holy Grail right in front of you. It provides the only viable framework 
for establishing a universal normative regime to govern net neutrality 
in practice, because it is the only option that operates as a unifying 
“theory of everything.” All other approaches — those rooted in 
technical, economic, or public interest values — have a place in the 
human rights framework as quantitative and qualitative inputs for the 
analysis of the State’s obligations to promote and protect the rights of 
their people (Carrillo, 2016, Part IV). The following sections will explain 
how this is so by mapping, respectively, the United Nations and Inter-
American human rights systems in relevant part.
4.2.1 The United Nations Human Rights System
In Latin America, this system is commonly referred to as the “universal” 
human rights system, and for good reason. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) has 168 State Parties, 
encompassing over 85% of the world’s population (OHCHR, 2016). Its 
core principles arguably apply to nearly all countries on he planet.147 
When discussing human rights online, the U.N. framework is the 
place to start. This is due not just to its (near) universal coverage, but 
also because United Nations experts and authorities engaged in its 
development have expressly extended the framework’s application to 
the digital realm. 
147 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be considered a source of customary 
international law for core norms like freedom of expression, which thus applies to all UN 
member States regardless of whether they have ratified the ICCPR or not. 
Part I: Zero Rating Policy
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Network neutrality is today a consolidated norm of international 
human rights law due to the seminal role it plays in the protection 
of freedom of expression and non-discrimination rights in 
contemporary society. Article 19 of the ICCPR affirms the right “to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless 
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, 
or through any other media of […] choice.” Freedom of expression 
enjoys near universal acceptance worldwide, not least because it 
is an enabler of several other basic human rights. These include 
not just the corollary rights to hold opinions and religious beliefs 
without interference, but several others as well, such as the right to 
education, the rights to freedom of association and assembly, the 
right to full participation in social, cultural and political life, and the 
right to social and economic development (U.N. Special Rapporteur, 
2011, p. 18). 
Traditionally, freedom of expression has been broken down into 
several constituent elements, including the right to impart and 
express information on the one hand, and the right to seek and 
receive information on the other (UNHRC, 2011, paras. 11, 18).148 With 
the rise of electronic communications, this framework has evolved 
to accommodate the expression and receipt of information via 
the Internet. In international human rights law, it is settled that the 
constituent rights comprising freedom of expression will apply to all 
“internet-based modes of communication” (UNHRC, 2011, para. 12). 
International experts from the United Nations, the OAS, and other 
human rights systems have further recognized that “[t]here should 
be no discrimination in the treatment of Internet data and traffic, 
based on the device, content, author, origin and/or destination of the 
content, service or application” (Joint Declaration, 2011, para. 5(a)). 
This, of course, is the technical definition of net neutrality. Among 
other things, it means that “[a]ny restrictions on the operation of 
websites, blogs or any other internet-based, electronic or other such 
information dissemination system, including systems to support such 
communication, such as internet service providers or search engines, 
are only permissible to the extent that they are compatible with [the 
exceptions regime set out in] paragraph 3 [of Article 19]” (UNHRC, 
2011, para. 43). This regime is discussed in more detail below.
148 The other elements are media rights, including media diversity and pluralism online, as 
well as access to information from public bodies. 
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Rounding out the panoply of freedom of expression elements 
relating to net neutrality is the right to access information online, 
or connectivity. Put simply, “[g]iving effect to the right to freedom 
of expression imposes an obligation on States to promote universal 
access to the Internet” (U.N. Special Rapporteur et. al. 2011, para. 
6(a)). The U.N. General Assembly (2016) recently reaffirmed the 
“the importance of applying a comprehensive human rights-based 
approach in providing and in expanding access to Internet and 
requests all States to make efforts to bridge the many forms of digital 
divides[,]” (para. 5). While falling short of creating an independent 
human right to access, the General Assembly confirms the integral 
function of connectivity to the full and effective realization by 
States of fundamental rights like freedom of expression, among 
others (the right to education is another prominent example).
This positive obligation means that for States to meet their duty 
to respect and fulfill the right to freedom of expression, they must 
guarantee that all people within their territory have access to “the 
means necessary to exercise this right, which [today] includes the 
Internet” (U.N. Special Rapporteur, 2011, para. 61). Accordingly, the U.N. 
Human Rights Committee (2011) has called upon States “to take all 
necessary steps to foster the independence of […] new media […] such 
as internet and mobile based electronic information dissemination 
systems […] and to ensure access of all individuals thereto” (para. 15)
(emphasis added). Connectivity is thus “essential” to realizing freedom 
of expression (U.N. Special Rapporteur, 2011, para. 61). At the same 
time, the Human Rights Committee (2011) has affirmed that the duty 
incumbent on States to implement these norms includes the obligation 
“to ensure that persons are protected from any acts by private persons 
or entities that would impair the enjoyment of the freedoms of opinion 
and expression to the extent that these […] rights are amenable to 
application between private persons or entities.” (para. 7).
Net neutrality is, at heart, a norm of non-discrimination. On this point, 
the ICCPR establishes in Article 2 that State parties are obligated 
“to respect and to ensure to all individuals within [their] territory 
and subject to [their] jurisdiction the [human] rights recognized […] 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status.” What counts as “other status” for purposes 
of determining which additional distinctions might lead to negative 
(or positive) discrimination is in open question. What is certain is 
Part I: Zero Rating Policy
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that international human rights law recognizes distinctions based 
on economic status or criteria, and evaluates whether their purpose 
or effect is to nullify or impair the exercise or enjoyment of other 
human rights (Haraldsson and Sveinsson v. Iceland, 2007). This is 
the reason why proposed restrictions on net neutrality like zero 
rating, which offer free preferential access to parts of the Internet, 
must be examined closely to evaluate their impact on the exercise 
of freedom of expression.
To the extent that network neutrality is understood as a principle 
of non-discrimination applied to users’ rights to request, receive 
or impart data or information online, it meshes organically with 
the core non-discrimination norms of international human rights 
law. But not all discrimination is per se illegal: International law 
differentiates between negative and positive types. The “principle 
of equality sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative 
action in order to diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or 
help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited [by international law]” 
(UNHRC, 1989, para. 10). For this reason, “[n]ot every differentiation 
of treatment will constitute [unlawful] discrimination, if the criteria 
for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim 
is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under [international 
law]” (UNHRC, 1989, para. 13). In other words, positive or affirmative 
discrimination can be an exceptional measure which enhances or 
increases the overall exercise and enjoyment of human rights.
Zero rating acts as a discriminatory restriction on network neutrality, 
which, as we have seen, is part and parcel of the rights to freedom 
of expression and non-discrimination. Under international human 
rights law, there are some circumstances in which such a restriction 
may be permitted (Carrillo, 2016, Part III.B.6). This is because human 
rights norms in general, and freedom of expression in particular, 
are not absolute. Defamation laws are a classic example of the hard 
limits imposed on freedom of expression in order to protect the 
rights of others (UNHRC, 2011, para. 47).149 And, just as “legitimate 
differentiation” in favor of historically disadvantaged groups can 
effectively advance the goals of non-discrimination, (UNHRC, 1989, 
para. 10), so too can the freedom of expression rights of some (to 
149 Another good example is ICCPR Art. 20, which explicitly enumerates a series of 
offensive forms of expression that must be curtailed by States in order to meet their 
obligations under the treaty. (“1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. 
2) Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”)
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impart or receive information freely) be curtailed through positive 
discrimination (zero rating) aimed at promoting the freedom of 
expression rights of others (to connectivity) (UNHRC, 2011, para. 
28; Carrillo, 2016, Part IV.A). The issue then becomes whether such 
“legitimate” discrimination is necessary and proportional in relation 
to the compelling aim it seeks to advance.
Similarly, Article 19.3 of the ICCPR expressly permits certain restrictions 
on the right to freedom of expression when necessary to “respect of 
the rights or reputations of others,” or to advance “the protection 
of national security, or of public order […], or of public health or 
morals.” These are, generally speaking, the legitimate aims that may 
be invoked by States seeking to impose limits on fundamental human 
rights, including expression (U.N. Special Rapporteur, 2013, para. 28). 
In addition to pursuing a legitimate goal, a State seeking to curtail 
freedom of expression (or any human right for that matter) must ensure 
that the measures doing so are “provided by law,” “necessary” to meet 
the stated aim, and “proportional” (UNHRC, 2011, paras. 24-26, 33-34; 
ICCPR, 1966, art. 19.3). Generally speaking, such restrictions should 
be enacted into formal law through a transparent and participatory 
political process (U.N. Special Rapporteur, 2013, paras. 81-83). In any 
case, such laws “must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable 
an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly;” they must 
also be accessible to the public (UNHRC, 2011, para. 35, note 275).
Assuming that a State’s goal is to advance a legitimate aim recognized 
by international human rights law, a proposed restriction on freedom 
of expression involving zero rating, to be permissible, must not only be 
provided by law, it must also be necessary and proportional in relation 
to that goal. This is meant to set a high bar for recognizing a small 
set of narrowly tailored measures (UNHRC, 2011, note 275 para. 35). 
To be “necessary,” legally enacted limits must be “directly related to 
[meeting] the specific need on which they are predicated,” i.e. they 
must be effective at doing what they are intended to do (UNHRC, 
2011, para. 22). A restriction is not indispensable, and thus “violates the 
test of necessity [,] if the protection could be achieved in other ways 
that do not restrict freedom of expression” (UNHRC, 2011, para. 33). 
Finally, any steps taken by States to limit expression, even if legitimate 
and necessary, cannot be “overbroad” (UNHRC, 2011, para. 34). 
Proportionate measures are those that are “appropriate to achieve 
their protective function” and “the least intrusive … amongst those 
[available]” (UNHRC, 2011, para. 34). 
Part I: Zero Rating Policy
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In other words, whether or not a zero rating practice can be a 
permissible restriction on net neutrality, and thus freedom of 
expression, is a fact-specific and context driven question. For 
example, permitting a zero-rated platform like Internet.org to operate 
in a country with a deep digital divide and poor infrastructure like 
Zambia would most likely advance rather than violate its human 
rights commitments, so long as the national context and platform’s 
characteristics did not render its deployment unnecessary (because 
there are better alternatives) or overbroad (because it discriminates 
inappropriately or unfairly) in relation to the access goals pursued 
(Carrillo, 2016, Part IV.C-D).
4.2.2 The Inter-American (OAS) Human Rights System
In her 2014 report, the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Expression (“OAS Special Rapporteur”) affirmed that American 
Convention on Human Rights Article 13 governing freedom of 
expression “applies fully to communications, ideas and information 
distributed through the Internet” (para. 2). Further interpreting the 
American Convention, the OAS Special Rapporteur (2014) observed 
that respecting net neutrality “is a necessary condition for exercising 
freedom of expression on the Internet pursuant to the terms Article 
13” (para. 25). This is because “[n]et neutrality is part of the original 
design of the Internet [and] is fundamental for guaranteeing the 
plurality and diversity of the flow of information” (paras. 27-28). As 
these statements indicate, the Inter-American human rights system 
goes even further than its U.N. counterpart to address and protect 
net neutrality principles in several important respects.
Article 13 of the American Convention tracks article 19 of the ICCPR 
in most key respects, but differs positively in others that are worth 
highlighting. Like its U.N. counterpart, Article 13 safeguards freedom of 
expression in all its dimensions (para. 1) and establishes an exceptions 
regime that functions almost identically to the Article 19 version 
described above (para. 2).150 But, it also adopts an express ban on “prior 
censorship” (para. 2), as well as on restrictions “by indirect methods 
or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over 
newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the 
dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede 
the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions” (Art. 13.3)
150 For a detailed description of how the provisions in Article 13 are applied, please see the 
Report of the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, paras 52-72.
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(emphasis added). In this same vein, the American Convention articles 
which bar discrimination in the implementation and safeguarding of 
the treaty’s rights expressly recognize unlawful distinctions made on 
the basis of “economic status” (Arts. 1.1 and 24). This, too, distinguishes 
the Convention in contrast with its counterpart, the ICCPR.
It is difficult to overstate the significance of these normative 
protections for net neutrality and freedom of expression in the 
Americas. Among the primary legal consequences catalogued by the 
OAS Special Rapporteur (2014) are that States party to the American 
Convention must:
¡¡ Guarantee the effective implementation of the net neutrality 
principle through “adequate legislation” (para. 26), which should 
be “based on dialogue among all actors […] to maintain the basic 
characteristics of the original environment, strengthening the 
Internet’s democratizing capacity and fostering universal and 
nondiscriminatory access” (para.11).151
¡¡ Ensure that “free access and […] choice [by users] to use, send, 
receive or offer any lawful content, application or service through 
the Internet [that] is not subject to conditions, or directed or 
restricted, such as blocking, filtering or interference” (para. 25);
¡¡ Guarantee that any restrictions to net neutrality and freedom of 
expression “be established by law, formerly and in practice, and 
that the laws in question be clear” (para. 58).; such restrictions 
must also advance a legitimate State objective of the type 
listed in Article 13 paragraph 2, which includes respecting the 
rights of others, and conform to basic principles of necessity, 
proportionality and due process. (para. 55).
¡¡ Regulations or other implementing norms “that create uncertainty 
with regard to the scope of the right protected and whose 
interpretation could lead to arbitrary rulings that could arbitrarily 
compromise the right to freedom of expression would [also] be 
incompatible with the American Convention” (para. 58).
¡¡ Protect pluralism online by “ensuring that changes are not made 
to the Internet that result in a reduction in the number of voices 
and amount of content available [to] allow for the search for and 
circulation of information and ideas of all kinds […] pursuant to the 
terms of Article 13 of the American Convention” (para. 19);
151 See the Special Rapporteur’s discussion of the principles that should guide Internet 
governance at the national level, which contemplate multi-sectorial participation 
through democratic processes in the devising of Internet policies and regulations (OAS 
Special Rapporteur, 2014, paras. 177-180).
Part I: Zero Rating Policy
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¡¡ Adopt measures necessary “to prevent or remove the illegitimate 
restrictions to Internet access put in place by private parties and 
corporations, such as policies that threaten net neutrality or foster 
anticompetitive practices” (para. 51).
¡¡ Respect and guarantee not just the individuals’ freedom of 
expression rights, but also those of society as well. This “dual 
dimension” inherent in the right to freedom of expression means 
that it is “both the right to communicate to others one’s point of 
view and any information or opinion desired, as well as the right 
of everyone to receive and hear those points of view, information, 
opinions, stories and news, freely and without interference that 
would distort or block it” (para. 19).
4.3 Net Neutrality in Latin America
Having canvassed the applicable legal norms of the United Nations 
and OAS systems in Part I, it is now possible to consider how the 
unified human rights framework comprised of both sets of norms 
applies in Latin American countries struggling to address net 
neutrality and zero rating issues. This Part has two objectives. 
The first is to identify the main challenges to safeguarding net 
neutrality in the region, using zero rating as an example; the second 
is to suggest a new perspective on how best to respond to those 
challenges in light of the applicable human rights law framework.
It helps that digital rights activists in Latin America have been 
active in this area. An excellent report published by the Colombian 
NGO Karisma Foundation (“Karisma Report”) in conjunction 
with other digital rights advocates from around the region, in 
particular Red para la Defensa de los Derechos Digitales (R3D) in 
Mexico, captures and analyzes ongoing zero rating practices in 
five countries: Colombia, Mexico, Ecuador, Paraguay and Panama 
(Karisma Foundation, 2016). From this report I will discuss the 
first two — Mexico, Colombia — to briefly illustrate how the legal 
and policy debates in those countries around net neutrality have 
and will continue to be shaped by the human rights frameworks 
outlined in Part I. To that short list, I will add Chile, based on the 
work of Derechos Digitales, another respected NGO operating in 
the region and primary author of a seminal report on digital rights in 
Latin America (APC Report, 2016). All three countries — Colombia, 
Mexico and Chile — are parties to the American Convention and 
the ICCPR. The following case studies, though brief, allow for a 
diagnosis of the primary issues arising from the interplay of net 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2966283
97
neutrality and human rights in practice. Not surprisingly, they 
revolve around the codification, implementation and enforcement 
of domestic legal norms. 
Mexico is an example of the way in which international human 
rights standards can influence the adoption of domestic norms 
protecting freedom of expression and net neutrality. In 2013, Mexico 
approved a bill to amend its Political Constitution in the area of 
telecommunications (OAS Special Rapporteur, 2014, para. 5). In a 
prescriptive move that tracks the special protections of American 
Convention Article 13.3, the Mexican legislature amended Article 
7 of the Constitution, which safeguards freedom of expression, 
to prohibit restrictions of that right “by indirect methods or 
means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over 
newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in 
the dissemination of information, or by any other means” (Mexican 
Constitution, Art. 7).152 This near verbatim incorporation of American 
Convention Article 13.3’s protections into Mexican constitutional law 
has substantial implications for the ongoing policy debates in that 
country around how best to define and regulate net neutrality, which 
was codified but not defined by the Federal Telecommunications 
and Broadcasting Law practices (Karisma Foundation, 2016, pp. 48-
49). This is especially true with respect to the widespread zero rating 
practices currently on display in Mexico that, on their face, would 
seem to contradict the aforementioned constitutional protections 
(Karisma Foundation, 2016, pp. 48-51; APC Report, p. 5) as well as 
the country’s human rights obligations.
Colombia, on the other hand, has enacted legislation that defines 
net neutrality and claims to safeguard it. At the same time, however, 
the law raises serious questions, first, about whether the definition is 
adequate, and second, regarding whether the law’s implementation 
will conform to international standards. In 2011, Colombia enacted Law 
1450 that seems to codify a strong concept of net neutrality, one which 
expressly prohibits blocking, interfering, discriminating or restricting 
Internet users’ rights to access, send, receive or publish any content, 
application or service online. At the same time, however, it goes on 
to stipulate that service providers can “make offers depending on the 
needs of market sectors or of the providers’ subscribers according to 
their consumption and user profiles, which shall not be construed as 
152 Translation by the author.
Part I: Zero Rating Policy
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discrimination” (Karisma Foundation, 2016, p. 37).153 The implementing 
regulation makes clear that the Law’s proviso authorizes plans that 
provide Internet access limited to certain “generic” types of services, 
content or applications, so long as the service providers offer plans 
with unlimited Internet access alongside those which would restrict 
it (Karisma Foundation, 2016, p. 37). Karisma (2016) has correctly 
expressed concern that the conflicting language in the Law and 
implementing regulation threatens to undermine the net neutrality 
provision and turn it into a “joke” (p.37). Accordingly, because 
Colombia is a monist State, where international human rights law 
once ratified forms part of a “constitutional bloc” of norms that can 
be directly invoked in Colombian courts (Colombian Constitution, Art. 
93), it is not hard to see how this panorama could easily give rise to 
legal claims denouncing Law 1450 on human rights grounds.
Finally, Chile offers an illuminating example of the challenges to 
ensuring that otherwise strong net neutrality protections in law 
are adequately enforced. Chile is famous as the first country in 
the world to adopt a net neutrality law, in 2010. At a normative 
level, the Law’s provisions create a “blanket” bar to practices that 
violate net neutrality, including zero rating. It states that ISPs will 
not be able to arbitrarily block, interfere, discriminate, hinder or 
restrict content, applications or legal services that users seek to 
transmit or access through their networks. (Chilean Net Neutrality 
Law, 2010, Art. 24 H(a)). The Law’s prohibition on discrimination 
was applied to commonly zero-rated social media applications 
like Twitter, WhatsApp and Facebook. In 2014, the Subsecretería 
de Telecomunicaciones de Chile (Subtel), the telecommunications 
regulator, announced that such services were no longer allowed, 
subjecting any company that utilized them to fines (Meyer, 2014). 
Facebook’s Free Basics, part of Internet.org, was similarly shut 
down. (Rossini & Moore, 2015, pp. 17-18). 
Digital rights advocates in Chile welcomed this regulation on the 
grounds that permitting zero-rated social media platforms was 
harmful to net neutrality “from a technical, economic and legal 
perspective.”154 (Vera Hott, 2014). In practice, however, Chile’s net 
neutrality law today only bans zero rating by mobile operators 
of social media apps and services offered as promotional or 
153 Translation by the author. Emphasis added.
154 Translation by author.
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commercial schemes (Rossini & Moore, 2015, pp. 19-20). Some 
forms of zero rating continue to exist or be permitted by Subtel, 
including zero-rated social media platforms.155 Notably, in 2014 
Subtel issued an opinion stating that Wikipedia Zero did not 
violate the terms of the law, or Subtel’s interpretations of its net 
neutrality protections (Rossini & Moore, 2015, pp. 19-20). The result 
is normative dissonance, a situation where strong legal protections 
are not consistently implemented or enforced by the competent 
authorities, giving rise to potential human rights concerns.
In sum, the main challenges highlighted by the foregoing country 
case studies are (1) the need to enact strong constitutional, 
legislative and regulatory norms domestically to protect net 
neutrality in conformity with international (regional and universal) 
human rights standards; and (2) once an adequate legal framework 
has been established, ensuring that the national authorities charged 
with implementing and enforcing those net neutrality norms do so 
effectively and in line with the applicable international standards. 
As noted by Derechos Digitales, the Latin American experience has 
shown that, even where net neutrality “has been introduced as a 
relevant topic for regulation, this has happened in such a way as 
to leave the principle without effective practical application.” (APC 
Report, 2016, p. 5).156 Where this is the case, the question then 
becomes: how best to respond to the challenges identified?
Once again, the Latin American experience is telling. As the Karisma 
and APC Reports demonstrate, digital rights activists in Latin America 
are hard at work analyzing issues involving net neutrality and zero 
rating (among others) to advocate for more coherent public policies 
and equitable legal frameworks domestically. In doing so, these 
activists are actively exploring ways in which human rights standards, 
which often are part of domestic law, can be more effectively invoked 
in their pro-net neutrality advocacy (Karisma Foundation, 2016; 
APC Report, 2016). This work is important not just because of the 
normative and practical impact it has in their respective countries. 
It is important because the Latin American digital rights activists 
are at the same time forging a new social movement, one that 
increasingly emphasizes the role of human rights law in promoting 
155 See, e.g., ClaroChile, http://www.clarochile.cl/portal/cl/pc/personas/movil/redes-
sociales/#04-redes-sociales-en-tu-plan .
156 Translation by the author.
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and safeguarding net neutrality, rather than the other way around. To 
understand the significance of this distinction, it is necessary to take 
a quick look at how others have approached the issue.
By and large, the predominant approach to net neutrality advocacy 
has been to affirm that preserving an open Internet based on the 
end-to-end principle is necessary to ensuring freedom of expression 
and other human rights online (Belli & Van Bergen, 2013; NGO 
Coalition letter, 2015; Van Schewick, 2016). Advocates continue to 
stress that the original architecture of the Internet — decentralized, 
open and interconnected — together with the extraordinary benefits 
these characteristics have generated, are the primary and sufficient 
justification for enshrining the net neutrality principle in law and 
policy (Belli, 2015; Van Schewick, 2016). Clearly this approach 
has its strengths. But one weakness may be its reliance on what 
Lawrence Lessig (2006) calls the “is-ism” fallacy, the notion that 
conflates “how something is with how it must be” (p.32). Lessig 
(2006) cautions that “[t]here is no single way that the Net has to 
be; no single architecture that defines the nature of the Net” (p. 32). 
In this view, advocates for positive regulation of technology such as 
the Internet “should expect — and demand — that it can be made to 
reflect any set of values that we think important” (p. 32). In the case 
of net neutrality regulation, as we have seen, those values are best 
embodied in, and provided for by, the human rights law framework.
Respect for their human rights obligations under international law is 
today a primary reason for why States must effectively safeguard net 
neutrality (Carrillo, 2016, Part III.B). To view human rights protection 
as merely a beneficial consequence of preserving net neutrality on 
architectural grounds, as noted above, is to beg the questions of why 
strong net neutrality advances the values we want to preserve in the 
first place and what those values are. It works better to invert the 
proposition: advancing human rights norms will better protect net 
neutrality. Affirming that respect for net neutrality is a duty incumbent 
on States in line with their human rights obligations fortifies pro-net 
neutrality advocacy with a matrix of technical legal arguments that 
policy prescriptions alone, no matter how compelling, lack. Digital 
rights activists thus can — and should — insist that their government 
comply with its human rights obligations by adopting, implementing, 
and enforcing adequate net neutrality safeguards domestically, 
because that approach will in most cases enhance the impact and 
traction of their advocacy on the ground. 
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This is precisely the process underway in much of Latin America, 
where it has become apparent that advocacy strategies grounded 
on preferred policy prescriptions such as preserving the open 
Internet may be insufficient to adequately anchor strong net 
neutrality in domestic legislation and regulation in many countries. 
That is one of the lessons to be derived from the concise case 
studies of the Latin American experience examined above. In 
response, Latin American activists are increasingly drawing on 
human rights norms to ensure greater normative coherence and 
influence in their pro-net neutrality advocacy, a strategic shift 
that is reflected in the latest reports from the Karisma Foundation 
(2016) and Derechos Digitales (APC Report, 2016). As these 
strategies spread, deepen and mature throughout the region, we 
are sure to see further developments on net neutrality front in the 
Latin American context from which to learn.
4.4 Conclusion
As goes Latin America, so goes the world, at least with respect 
to net neutrality. That is to say that the experiences and lessons 
drawn from the region in relation to net neutrality and zero rating 
are relevant to what is happening — and will happen — in other 
parts of the world as well. As noted in the Introduction, the human 
rights standards that apply in Latin America are substantially the 
same that apply everywhere; the variations are in the systems 
and mechanisms in place regionally to enforce them. And the 
challenges faced by digital rights activists in Africa, Asia, Europe 
and elsewhere who care about net neutrality are also essentially 
the same: hold governments to their legal obligations to guarantee 
adequate codification, implementation and enforcement of strong 
domestic norms in line with international standards. This approach 
by definition promotes fuller enjoyment of freedom of expression 
and related human rights by more people than any other. It also 
provides a more coherent and consistent approach to net neutrality 
issues across countries and regions of the world, thanks to the 
universal standards that underlie it. As the convergence of human 
and digital rights deepens in this way, advocacy and policy outcomes 
around net neutrality issues will likely become more equitable, and 
consequently, more sustainable in the long run. 
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